The EPA Clean Power Plan seeks to apply a carbon policy within the framework of Clean Air Act authority applied to existing fossil fuel electricity generation. Carbon Standards The clean energy agenda seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A framework for evaluating regulation of greenhouse gases would reflect the nature of the problem. A carbon tax would provide the benchmark for evaluation.
 Theory o Global impacts.
o Balance of costs and global benefits. o Command and control framework discriminates across technologies and vintages.
CLEAN ENERGY Carbon Standards
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that greenhouse gases were not pollutants as defined in the Clean Air Act (CAA), and in 2009 EPA came forward with its endangerment finding that required regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.
 The Court decision settled the jurisdictional question as a legal matter.
 Debates continue over the merits of the resulting regulations.
o The "Tailoring Rule" defers addressing many sources. "The rule establishes a schedule that will initially focus CAA permitting programs on the largest sources with the most CAA permitting experience. … The CAA permitting program emissions thresholds for criteria pollutants such as lead, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, are 100 and 250 tons per year (tpy). While these thresholds are appropriate for criteria pollutants, they are not feasible for GHGs because GHGs are emitted in much higher volumes. … Without this tailoring rule, the lower emissions thresholds would take effect automatically for GHGs on January 2, 2011. PSD and title V requirements at these thresholds would lead to dramatic increases in the number of required permits -tens of thousands of PSD permits and millions of title V permits. State, local, and tribal permitting authorities would be overwhelmed and the programs' abilities to manage air quality would be severely impaired." (Enviornmental Protection Agency, 2010) o Different authorities apply to mobile sources, new stationary sources and existing stationary sources. Some authority allows for federal implementation, and others require state implementation plans.
CLEAN ENERGY EPA Carbon Standards
The Environmental Protection Agency proposed different standards for new and existing stationary sources. The final rule scheduled for "Summer 2015."
"The Clean Air Act lays out distinct approaches for addressing new and existing sources under Section 111: a federal program for new sources and state programs for existing sources.
o Section 111 (b) is the federal program to address new, modified and reconstructed sources by establishing standards of performance.  EPA is proposing two standards for natural gas-fired stationary combustion units, depending on size. … 1,000 lb CO2/MWh-gross for larger units, 1,100 lb CO2/MWhgross for smaller units.  New natural gas-fired stationary combustion turbines can meet the proposed standard without the need for add-on control technology.  The proposed limits for fossil fuel-fired utility boilers and IGCC units are based on the performance of a new efficient coal unit implementing partial carbon capture and storage (CCS).  These limits require capture of only a portion of the CO2 from the new unit. … 1,100 lb CO2/MWh-gross over a 12-operating month period, or 1,000-1,050 lb CO2/MWh-gross over an 84-operating month (7-year) period (Chang, 2014)  The standard includes measurable observables (fossil outputs, renewables) and unobservables that must be estimated from a counterfactual (new energy efficiency).  The proposed rule treats old and new differently (nuclear and efficiency).
 The proposed rule allows for mass-based and rate-based standards. These are not the same and have different incentive effects.  The proposed rule is applied differently for each state, undermining cooperation.
 The call for flexibility is not matched with incentives to make efficient choices.
 The state-based authority under Section 111(d) and concerns about "inside the fence" (fossil plant emissions) versus "outside the fence" (everything else) appear to drive the unusual structure. "Environmental dispatch is a policy in which the system operator explicitly considers environmental criteria (primarily air pollution emissions) when making dispatch decisions, even if the environmental impacts do not lead to an actual regulatory compliance cost." (National Association of Clean Air Agencies, 2015, p. ES-7)
IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS Clean Power Plan

ELECTRICITY MARKET Environmental Dispatch
How does EPA address the matter of environmental dispatch?
The Clean Power Plan analysis utilizes EPA's "Integrated Planning Model (IPM) … a multi-regional, dynamic, deterministic linear programming model of the U.S. electric power sector. It provides forecasts of least cost capacity expansion, electricity dispatch, and emission control strategies while meeting energy demand and environmental, transmission, dispatch, and reliability constraints." This is a zonal model built on load duration curves and inter-zonal transmission limits. IPM cannot replicate the impact of transmission constraints in actual dispatch operations. (http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/epa-ipm/BaseCasev513.html)
"EPA recognizes that the word "dispatch" can be used to describe how balancing authorities conduct realtime selection of specific generation (supply) to meet load (demand), on an hourly or even 15-minute basis.
In the context of the proposed CPP and in this [Technical Support Document] , the word "dispatch" is intended to refer to broader patterns of generation across different generating technologies over longer periods of time, in keeping with the compliance flexibilities afforded under this rule (e.g., where emission performance can be averaged over multiple years This is the only model that can meet the tests of open access and non-discrimination. Anything that upsets this design will unravel the wholesale electricity market.
Mechanisms that put a price on carbon will change the environmental footprint of economic dispatch.  Carbon Tax. The most direct means. The tax becomes part of the marginal cost for carbon emitting plants. There is a seamless integration with short-run economic dispatch.  Cap and Trade. An indirect approach. If the cap and trade system allows for banking and borrowing over any reasonably extended period, the current price of permits operates like a carbon tax. There can be a seamless integration with economic dispatch.
o Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI).
o CARB and CAISO-Pacificorp Energy Imbalance Market.
EPA acknowledges the importance of pricing carbon: "… there are a number of different ways that states can design programs that achieve required reductions while working within existing market mechanisms used to dispatch power effectively in the short term and to ensure adequate capacity in the long term. These programs and programs for conventional pollutants, such as the Acid Rain Program under Title IV of the CAA, have demonstrated that compliance with environmental programs can be monetized such that it is factored into power sector economic decision making in ways that reduce the cost of controlling pollution, maintain electricity system reliability and work within the least cost dispatching principles that are key to operation of our electric power grid. The proposal would also allow states to work together with individual companies on potential specific challenges. These and other flexibilities are discussed further in Section VIII of the preamble." 
Pricing carbon is the only way to maintain integrity of the electricity market design. Failure to acknowledge this reality can lead to mistaken or unintended consequences. The EPA Clean Power Plan analysis proceeds as though economic dispatch is not central to the market.
"Based on the analytic approach summarized above, the EPA has identified the following four principal categories-''building blocks''-of measures that provide the foundation of our BSER determination for CO2 emissions from existing EGUs:
1. Reducing the carbon intensity of generation at individual affected EGUs through heat rate improvements.
Reducing emissions from the most carbon-intensive affected EGUs in the amount that results from substituting generation at those EGUs with generation from less carbon-intensive affected EGUs (including NGCC units under construction).
3. Reducing emissions from affected EGUs in the amount that results from substituting generation at those EGUs with expanded low-or zero-carbon generation.  Increased use of gas may substitute for other renewables or nuclear.
Reducing emissions from affected
 New renewable plants may substitute for other renewables or nuclear.
 Energy efficiency can interact with grid congestion to cause higher CO2 emissions.
ELECTRICITY MARKET Environmental Dispatch
The PJM analysis of the Clean Power Plan confirms both the importance of pricing carbon and the surprising results of actual dispatch testing.  PJM modeled everything by using a price on carbon. The analysis included coordinated regional solutions and individual state solutions.  The result is uncertainty about the implied price of carbon. The uncertainty is not related to the long-run climate factors driving uncertainty for the social cost of carbon. With a well-designed carbon policy, all the options would produce the same price of carbon. These disparities signal trouble in electricity markets. Clean Power Plan
The proposed Clean Power Plan emphasizes the flexibility allowed in state implementation plans. There is much less attention to the incentives to exploit this flexibility towards an efficient outcome.
The conclusion of an important investigation of the incentives of the proposed rule finds important unintended consequences:
"There are many contexts in which environmental regulation and trade can interact to under-mine the efficiency of both. The EPA's Clean Power Plan is a clear and timely example of these interactions. The CPP proposes major reductions in carbon emissions from generators of electricity, a good that is perfectly substitutable across neighboring states. The CPP establishes state-level targets for carbon emissions rates in lbs of carbon dioxide per megawatt hour of electricity generated. … We find lack of coordination, when states independently pursue their own emissions targets without regard to electricity trading partners, leads to large inefficiencies. For example under state-specific caps, average abatement costs are nearly 25% higher than under a uniform mass-based standard. Under state-specific rate based targets, average abatement costs can nearly double relative to a uniform mass-based standard. Regional cooperation does little to mitigate these concerns. When two regions of the west coordinate internally, but adopt different instruments, average abatement costs remain 20-30% higher than costs under a uniform mass-based standard. Unfortunately, we find generator incentives do not favor coordination and may lead to adoption of less efficient mixed policies.
Overall, our findings indicate that despite the opportunities the CPP provides for states to coordinate and implement compliance plans that can efficiently achieve their joint targets, the incentives of individual states to participate in those plans are conflicted. Indeed, there can easily be circumstances when states find it in their own interest to adopt a regulatory approach that is contrary to those of its neighbors." (Bushnell et al., 2014) 
CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Brown Taxes and Green Subsidies
The EPA analysis implicitly assumes that there is one-for-one substitution between green energy and fossil fuels. This is not true.
"Subsidies pose a more general problem in this context. They attempt to discourage carbonintensive activities by making other activities more attractive. One difficulty with subsidies is identifying the eligible low-carbon activities. Why subsidize hybrid cars (which we do) and not biking (which we do not)? Is the answer to subsidize all low carbon activities? Of course, that is impossible because there are just too many low-carbon activities, and it would prove astronomically expensive. Another problem is that subsidies are so uneven in their impact. A recent study by the National Academy of Sciences looked at the impact of several subsidies on GHG emissions. It found a vast difference in their effectiveness in terms of CO 2 removed per dollar of subsidy. None of the subsidies were efficient; some were horribly inefficient; and others such as the ethanol subsidy were perverse and actually increased GHG emissions. The net effect of all the subsidies taken together was effectively zero! So in the end, it is much more effective to penalize carbon emissions than to subsidize everything else." (Nordhaus, 2013) (p. 266) 
ELECTRICITY MARKET Environmental Dispatch
Why is this important? The Clean Power Plan embeds contradictions of the Clean Air Act, carbon policy, and a collision with electricity market design.
 Wholesale power markets depend on the economic dispatch framework.
 Monetizing carbon is the key to meshing environmental goals and electricity market design.
 National carbon policy rejects a carbon tax (so far).
 EPAs Clean Power Plan does not require monetizing carbon.
 The Clean Power Plan proceeds with CAA supported rate-based standards and new ad hoc "building blocks" that are only loosely connected to the underlying social cost of carbon or the workings of electricity markets.
Will state implementation plans thread the needle to meet environmental goals?
Will the necessary electricity market design survive the regulatory gauntlet?
Will environmental dispatch implementation create perverse outcomes and arbitrage opportunities?
Will the future be the RGGI or CARB-CAISO-Pacificorp models, meshing carbon pricing and economic dispatch? Or will the future repeat the fiasco of the California-Enron electricity market design that prohibited economic dispatch?
APPENDIX CLIMATE AND ENERGY Going Green
The case for the success of the German Enrgiewende emphasizes the reduction in costs for future deployment rather than the immediate environmental benefits.
"The German (and Spanish, and several U.S. states) commitments to solar in the early, expensive years were not simply to purchase zero-carbon energy: Their main point was to drive down the price, so that there would be vast amounts of clean energy available at a reasonable price in the future. Looking back at the Energiewende, the proper question is not whether the initial tranche of renewable energy was cost-competitive with other technologies, but whether the investment drove the price down enough to give the world new, affordable, clean technology options." (emphasis in original) (Hal Harvey. (2013) ."A Tale of Two Countries: Renewable Energy in Germany." Energy Innovation LLC.)
CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Innovation and Deployment
A classification of major opportunities for cost reduction pathways focuses on "learning" broadly conceived. The terminology is not fully settled, but the basic ideas have been widely discussed. (Junginger, Sark, & Faaij, 2010)  Learning by searching (LBS): This is R&D broadly writ. The most important features include an intentional and costly effort to develop innovations. Typically the R&D is risky and there are large spillover effects. The goal is to develop the innovation until it is at or near the stage of large scale deployment.  Learning by doing (LBD): Early production produces new information which reduces the cost of future production. Critical characteristics include that LBD learning is passive (Thompson, 2010) and is treated as a free by-product of deployment. There can be significant spillover effects.  Learning by using (LBU): The demand side counterpart for learning by doing. Often not treated separately from learning by doing.  Learning by waiting (LBW): The spillover effects from other industries, technologies or countries are essentially exogenous from the perspective of the firm in the present industry. (Thompson, 2010) The resulting benefits from the innovative technology will appear over time and can be exploited by waiting.
Another pathway often mentioned is important but has different policy implications.  Economies of scale: The standard argument about decreasing unit production costs as production plant reaches an efficient size. In the energy market this is unlikely to be a marketwide phenomenon, i.e. the case of natural monopoly, but may be relevant at the firm level. (Gillingham & Sweeney, 2010) However, "significant economies of scale in any industry, short of creating a natural monopoly, are not generally seen as a basis for government intervention." (Borenstein, 2012) (p. 83) 
CLEAN ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES Learning and Deployment
The alternative cases illustrate the tradeoff between "LBS-LBW", and LBD. The LBD premium is relatively small, especially when compared with the impact of the assumed fossil externalities.
Without a fossil externality price, an assumed 5% rate of exogenous technological change takes a very long time to make the clean technologies competitive. The wait is essentially forever. Hence, the LBD premium is essentially zero. The premium becomes larger in the distant future and reaches its maximum when deployment begins, but the maximum learning premium is still relatively small.
With a fossil externality, it is still optimal to wait. The immediate premium is larger and the optimal waiting period is shorter for the wind type technology.
The learning premium is small compared to the benefits of reducing the dirty externality.
